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A NOTE ON HINTIKKA'S REFUTATION
OF THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT
William F. Vallicella
According to Jaakko Hintikka, "The mistake in the main version of the ontological
argument ... is an operator-switch fallacy.'" From
(I) N(Ex) [(y) (y exists -, x exists)]

one mistakenly infers
(2) (Ex)N [(y) (y exists

-+

x exists)].

What (1) says is that, necessarily, there is an individual such that if anything exists,
it exists. In a possible worlds semantic framework, (1) amounts to the claim that in
each possible world W there is an individual x such that if anything exists in W, x
exists in W. This leaves open the possibility that the condition is satisfied by different individuals in different possible worlds. That is, it leaves open the possibility
that, for example, in WI, x = a while in W2, x = b. Thus (I) does not entail (2),
since (2) says that there is a unique individual, the same in all possible worlds, that
satisfies the condition. According to Hintikka, " ... the failure of this identity is
precisely the fatal flaw in the usual versions of the ontological argument." (p. 133)
Thus for Hintikka the proponent of the ontological argument is either illicitly
inferring (2) from (1), or else simply confusing the two and trying to derive the
benefits of both without paying the price of either. (1) is logically true, but trivial.
(2) is nontrivial, but not logically true. It is only by confusing (1) and (2), that
"Anselm, Descartes & Co." can claim a result that is both certain and nontrivial.
Although this diagnosis certainly helps illuminate the issues surrounding the
ontological argument, it is open to what I think is a fairly obvious objection.
Let us begin with the admission that the passage from (1) to (2) is a clear non
sequitur. But what exactly does this have to do with the ontological argument, in
say Anselm's Proslogion III version? As Hintikka is well aware, his diagnosis
succeeds only if (1) fairly represents what Anselm thinks he has proven. But is it
true that "the whole of (1) seems to express quite well the Anselmian idea that the
most perfect being-a being greater than which cannot be conceived of-must
necessarily exist ... "? (p. 129) It is hard to see how it does. First of all, (1)
embodies a questionable assimilation of the ontological to the cosmological
argument. But we shall let that pass since it seems Hintikka could have made his
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"operator-switch" point without that assimilation. Secondly, and more importantly, (1) is trivially true, and as Hintikka admits, "the triviality of (1) is reflected
by the fact that any existing individual can be chosen as the value of the existentially bound variable 'x' in (1)." (p. 130) Indeed, numerically the same individual
might be the value of both variables. But if anything can be the value of "x,"
(1) expresses nothing proper to God. For Ronald Reagan also has the property
of being such that, if anything exists, then he exists. Indeed, everything has this
property. Thus we must reject Hintikka's claim that "the inside conditional in
(1), viz. (y) (y exists -> x exists), can be considered as a characterization of god
(= x), conceived of as the most powerful being with respect to existence." (p.
129) For, to repeat, simply everything is characterized by this inside conditional!
The reason is easy to discern. The Philonian (material) conditional is such that
any two propositions can stand in the relation of material implication provided
that it is not the case that the antecedent is true and consequent false. Thus "The
Charles River exists" materially implies "Reagan exists." But this scarcely means
that one can validly infer the existence of Reagan from the existence of the
Charles River. The upshot is that (1), pace Hintikka, completely fails to express
"the Anselmian idea that the most perfect being ... must necessarily exist."
At the risk of belaboring the obvious, let me make it crystal clear where the
confusion lies. It lies in the sentence: "Thus the inside conditional in (1), viz.
(y) (y exists -> x exists), can be considered as a characterization of god (= x),
conceived of as the most powerful being with respect to existence." The part of
the sentence before "conceived" is no doubt true, but vacuously so: the inside
conditional characterizes God by virtue of characterizing everything. But the
second part of the sentence-the part after "conceived"--contradicts the first
part. For to conceive God as existentially most powerful is to conceive Him as
unique, as distinct from all else. Thus the sentence under analysis embodies a
confusion between a unique and a non-unique characterization of God. Hintikka
thinks he is giving what is needed, a unique characterization, but he is patently
failing to do so.
But this is not all; a further confusion seems to be at work. One way Hintikka's
claim that "the whole of (1) seems to express quite well the Anselmian idea that
the most perfect being . . . must necessarily exist" could be true would be if
the inside conditional in (1) expressed strict, rather than material, implication.
It would be a unique characterization of God to say of Him that his existence is
analytically entailed by the existence of any individual whatsoever. For surely
this does not hold of any individual other than God. But then Hintikka faces a
dilemma: Either the inside conditional in (1) expresses material implication, or
it expresses strict implication. If the former, then the inside conditional fails to
characterize God uniquely, and Hintikka's reconstruction of the ontological argument fails. If the latter, (1) transmogrifies into (2), as Hintikka is well aware.

A NOTE ON HINTIKKA

217

(p. 132) But if (I) collapses into (2), then there is no longer a basis for Hintikka's
charge of "operator-switch" fallacy. So either Hintikka fails to reconstruct the
argument, or he fails to show its invalidity.
Now Hintikka seems to be aware of something like this objection. His response
is that "If we try to insert a necessity-operator to front the inner conditional of
(1), we lose the trivial logical truth of (1)." (p. 132) This is no doubt true, but
simply throws him back onto the first hom of the dilemma, in which case he
fails to reconstruct any interesting version of the ontological argument, and
certainly not the most important version, the one contained in Proslogion llI.
These remarks may be summed up by saying that Anselm et al. cannot be
accused of confusing (1) and (2), for (1) has nothing to do with any interesting
version of the ontological argument inasmuch as (1) fails to characterize God
uniquely.
University of Dayton

NOTES
I. laakko Hintikka, "Kant on Existence, Predication, and the Ontological Argument," Dialectica,
vol. 35, nos. 1-2 (1981), p. 129. All further references are to this article. See also Hintikka's earlier
paper, "On the Logic of the Ontological Argument: Some Elementary Remarks," Models for Modalities: Selected Essays (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1969), pp. 45-54.

